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Abstract—Relay attacks are passive man in the middle attacks,
aiming to extend the physical distance of devices involved in
a transaction beyond their operating environment, within the
restricted time-frame. In the field of smartphones, proposals
have been put forward suggesting sensing the natural ambient
environment as an effective Proximity and Relay Attack Detec-
tion (PRAD) mechanism. However, these proposals are not in
compliance with industry imposed constraints (e.g. EMV and
ITSO) mandating that transactions should complete within a
certain time-frame (e.g. 500ms for EMV contactless transactions).
The generation of an artificial ambient environment (AAE) using
peripherals of the transaction devices has shown positive results
when using infrared light as an AAE actuator. In this paper we
propose the use of vibration as an alternative AAE actuator. We
empirically evaluated the effectiveness of the proposed solution
as a PRAD mechanism on an experimental test-bed that we
deployed. A total of 36,000 genuine and relay attack transaction
pairs were analysed using well-known machine learning algo-
rithms. The results of our analysis indicate that the proposed
solution is highly effective.
Index Terms—Mobile Payments, Mobile Ticketing, Relay At-
tacks, Ambient Environment Sensing, Contactless, Experimental
Analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart cards [1]–[5] and smartphones [6]–[9] are susceptible
to relay attacks [10]. Using a relay attack, an attacker may get
unauthorised access to services and facilities, like payments
and access to buildings. Proposals for countering relay attacks
in the field of smart cards suggest the use of distance bounding
protocols [11], [12]. In the field of smartphones, distance
bounding protocols may not be applicable due to unpredictable
behaviour related to their multi-process nature and the multitude
of hardware components [13]. Sensing of the natural ambient
environment has been proposed as a potential alternative against
the off-the-shelf attacker [14]–[19]. However, existing work
does not take into account industry specific restrictions. For
example, EMV contactless transactions have to complete within
500ms [20]–[22], and transport ticketing related transactions
typically require between 300 and 500ms [23].
Limited effectiveness of natural ambient sensing as a
Proximity and Relay Attack Detection (PRAD) mechanism in
transactions of up to 500ms has been demonstrated through
empirical evaluation [24], [25]. The generation and measure-
ment of an artificial ambient environment (AAE) based on
random bits or sequences by the peripherals of the transaction
devices has been proposed as an alternative. Evaluation of
infrared light as an AAE actuator has demonstrated positive
results [26].
In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of vibration
as an AAE actuator. One or both transaction devices vibrate a
randomly generated vibration pattern. The impact of the vibra-
tion is recorded by both transaction devices through selected
ambient sensors. The recorded data from the two devices is
subsequently compared in order to establish proximity evidence.
In order to assess the effectiveness of the proposed solution,
we deployed an evaluation test-bed. Based on trials, 36,000
genuine and relay transaction pairs, covering a wide range
of potential techniques that an attacker might use against the
proposed system were used. Analysis with popular machine
learning algorithms indicates that the proposed solution is
highly effective as a PRAD mechanism, especially in the case
of applying a gyroscope as the ambient sensor (0.1% Equal
Error Rate).
The main contribution of this paper are:
• Vibration as an AAE actuator (Section V): We proposed
the sensing of short (up to 500ms), random vibration
sequences, generated by the transaction devices, as a
means of PRAD.
• Evaluation of the proposed solution: We deployed an
evaluation test-bed (Section VI) in order to assess the
effectiveness of the proposed solution. We analysed 36,000
transactions, using different vibration modalities, ambient
sensors, and potential attack techniques. The dataset was
evaluated using well-known machine learning algorithms
(Section VII). The results indicate high effectiveness
of the proposed solution, and resilience against relay
attacks, when using certain sensors (namely, accelerometer,
gyroscope, linear acceleration, magnetic field, and rotation
vector).
This paper is organised as follows:
• In Section II, an overview of relay attacks is given.
• Section III lists related works in the field.
• The use of AAEs as PRAD methods is described in
Section IV.
• The theoretical framework of using vibration as an AAE
actuator is described in Section V.
• In Section VI, the details of the evaluation framework for
the proposed solution are described.
• The experimental results are provided in Section VII.
• Discussion of the results is performed in Section VIII.
• Finally, concluding remarks are made in Section IX.
II. RELAY ATTACKS
A variety of applications is affected by relay attacks,
like Near Field Communication (NFC) based contactless
transactions. During a relay attack, the goal of the attacker is
to relay communication messages between two devices that
are located beyond their designated operational environment,
without being detected.
The relay of the communication messages is performed using
some relay equipment that the attacker possesses. For example,
for the case of an NFC contactless payment scenario (Figure 1),
an attacker can present to a genuine user a masqueraded
(malicious) payment terminal. At a distant location, the attacker
should present a masqueraded (malicious) payment instrument
to a genuine payment terminal. When the user attempts to
perform a transaction, the communication messages of the
payment transaction will be relayed between the attacker’s
relay equipment. If the attack is successful, an unauthorised
transaction between two genuine parties has been performed.
Fig. 1. Overview of a Relay Attack
Relay attacks against mobile devices have been demon-
strated [4], [8], [9], [27]. In order to detect the existence of a
relay attack, evidence regarding the co-presence of the genuine
transaction devices should be established. As already mentioned,
in the field of smartphones, establishment of proximity evidence
by the assistance of ambient sensing has demonstrated positive
results. This technique requires the two transaction devices to
capture environmental data, using some ambient sensor, for
some predefined period of time.
An alternative approach, by generating an artificial ambient
environment (AAE) using the peripherals of the communicating
devices has also demonstrated positive results. Using infrared
light as an AAE actuator has demonstrated high effectiveness
as a PRAD mechanism in transactions with industry imposed
time limits of up to 500ms, like EMV contactless payments
and transport ticketing.
With both techniques, the data from the two devices is then
compared for similarity, based on which a decision is made
regarding their co-presence. The comparison process can be
performed either by one of the communicating devices, or by
a trusted third party (TTP).
III. RELATED WORK
Ma et al. [15] proposed the use of GPS (Global Positioning
System) as a means of co-location detection. A time frame
of 10 seconds was used for data collection, and values were
recorded every second. High success rate was reported by the
authors for proximity detection.
Halevi et al. [14] proposed the use of ambient light and sound.
Values were captured for 30 and two seconds, respectively. The
authors used various comparison algorithms, and high success
rate was reported.
Varshavsky et al. [19] compared the WiFi networks, along
with the signal strengths, that the devices were able to detect.
The main objective of this work was device pairing, and positive
results were reported.
Urien et al. [18] combined ambient temperature and an
elliptic-curve based RFID and/or NFC authentication protocol.
No performance results were presented by the authors, as there
was no practical implementation.
Mehrnezhad et al. [28] recorded values using the accelerom-
eter of the devices involved in a payment transaction in order
to detect device co-location. A double tap was required in
their proposal. According to the authors, the transaction time
lasted between 0.6 and 1.5 seconds, and a high success rate
was observed.
Truong et al. [17] assessed a variety of sensors for proximity
detection. The recording time frame was between 10 and 120
seconds, and positive results were reported.
Shrestha et al. [16] used a Sensordrone and recorded multiple
sensors. The precise sample duration is not provided in this
work, however the authors state that recordings lasted for a
few seconds.
In [24] and [25], the effectiveness of recording the natural
ambient environment in short transactions (up to 500ms) was
empirically evaluated, with results different from those in the
existing literature. Comparison algorithms used in previous
works, as well as machine learning techniques, produced a
large number of false negative results.
Further work on using the ambient environment for device
co-location has been performed in the field of two-factor
authentication (2FA). Karapanos et al. [29] proposed using
sound as a means of proximity detection, for 2FA. The aim
of the authors was to provide a more usable 2FA method than
the existing ones, in order to make 2FA more widely accepted.
In previous work [26], we proposed a PRAD framework by
using artificial ambient environments (AAE). Infrared light was
evaluated as an AAE actuator. The challenge for the attacker in
this case would be to accurately relay a 100ms long random bit
sequence in the form of infrared pulses and pauses, generated
by the transaction instrument. Failure to timely and accurately
relay the sequence would lead to a detection of the attack, as the
transaction terminal stops listening for infrared signals 100ms
after the transaction initiation. Relay attacks were successfully
detected, while the false rejection rate was approximately 2%.
IV. ARTIFICIAL AMBIENT ENVIRONMENT-BASED RELAY
ATTACK DETECTION
In order to increase the irreproducibility and uniqueness of
the ambient environment, the transaction devices can generate
an artificial environment using a peripheral, measurable by
Fig. 2. Framework Architecture
an ambient sensor(s). The artificial environment should be
based on randomly generated bits or sequences to act as a
second (out-of-band) channel (Figure 2) for assuring proximity
between the transaction devices.
Upon initiation of a transaction, one (unidirectional) or
both (bidirectional) the devices should be responsible for the
generation and/or sensing of the AAE for some predefined time.
Upon completion of the sensor measurement, a comparison of
the captured data of one device against the captured data of the
other device, or the generated data used to construct the AAE,
should take place. The comparison can either be performed by
one of the communicating parties, or by a trusted third party.
Only data captured while the Artificial Ambient Channel
(AAC) is active should be considered during the comparison,
and any data captured outside the time-frame should be
discarded. This way, an attacker cannot capture the generated
sequence and then reproduce it at a remote location, as delayed
streams (outside the AAC time frame) are disregarded. For an
effective AAE, the attacker should also not be able to accurately
relay the information from the second channel, such that the
comparing party cannot distinguish between a legitimate and
an illegitimate transaction with a high degree of confidence.
So, the basic principles of an AAE should be:
1) The AAE generation should be based on random
bits/sequences.
2) The AAE should provide sufficient evidence in order for
two genuine devices to establish proximity assurance.
3) The AAE should be hard for an attacker to accurately
reproduce at a remote location.
The main goal of the AAEs is to protect against off-the-
shelf attackers. By the term ‘off-the-shelf attacker’ we refer
to an attacker with access to off-the-shelf, state of the art
equipment, without capabilities to build customised hardware
or channels with the purpose to defeat the proposed scheme. A
resourceful attacker with access to state of the art equipment
might be capable of effectively and timely reproducing the
same conditions at a remote location. However, smartphones
suffer from multiple security issues [30], and therefore using
such devices for security critical applications should be avoided,
so resourceful attackers are not the main concern.
Peripherals widely available on modern smartphones that
could potentially act as AAE actuators include: 1) the infrared
emitter, 2) the speaker, 3) the flash light, 4) the device’s
vibration, 5) the device’s display, 6) the WiFi, 7) the Bluetooth,
and 8) the camera.
V. VIBRATION AS AN AAE ACTUATOR
In this section we present the basic principles of using
vibration as an AAE actuator.
A. AAE Framework
The genuine user is asked to place the Transaction Instrument
(TI) on the Transaction Terminal (TT). Upon initiation of
the transaction, one (unidirectional) or both (bidirectional)
transaction devices vibrate using some randomly generated
pattern. Simultaneously, both devices use some ambient sensor
to measure the impact of the vibration over a period of time.
In this work, we used a 500ms vibration pattern and recording.
In the case that both devices vibrate, a fusion of the two
random vibrations is causing the impact. Candidate sensors,
available on a wide range of modern smartphones, that can
potentially be used to measure the impact of the vibration
include: 1) the accelerometer, 2) the geomagnetic rotation
vector, 3) the gyroscope, 4) the magnetic field, 5) the rotation
vector, 6) the gravity sensor, and 7) the linear acceleration
sensor.
The vibration-based AAE channel (referred to as the ‘vibra-
tion channel’) is used as an out-of-band channel1, along with
the main communication channel (e.g. NFC, WiFi), aiming to
provide proximity assurances. The initiation of the vibration
channel should be subsequent to the initiation of the main
communication channel for each of the devices, with as minimal
delays as possible, in order to minimise the attack window.
Upon completion of the transaction, data streams captured
by the sensors of the two devices are compared for similarity.
The similarity comparison can be performed either by one of
the transaction devices, or by a Trusted Third Party (TTP). The
exact characteristics and architecture of the party responsible
for the comparison (i.e. one of the transaction devices or the
TTP) are beyond the scope of this paper. Of course, the recoded
data streams should be communicated to the comparison party
in an encrypted and authenticated form.
B. Threat Model
In this paper, the attacker is of opportunistic nature and
requires no prior interaction or knowledge of either TT or TI.
Scenarios where TT or TI are compromised will not be covered
in this paper because a relay attack is unlikely to be required
to achieve the attacker’s goals when this is the case. The focus
of this paper is on proximity assurance for genuine devices.
We assume that the attacker only has access to off-the-
shelf relay equipment. Usually transaction limits apply on
transactions using smartphones, for example a £30 limit on
digital payment transactions in the UK [31]. Therefore, due to
the limited finanical gain involved, a powerful attacker with
advanced and expensive relay equipment is not our major
concern.
1Out-of-band channel: Second channel
For the same reason, we assume that the attacker can only
try to guess the pattern vibrated by the genuine devices. More
advanced attacks, like acoustic attacks, during which an attacker
captures the vibration pattern by performing acoustic analysis
and replays it at a distant location, are not considered. Even
though acoustic attacks have been demonstrated in the context
of decoding a vibration pattern [32], combining an acoustic
and a relay attack by relaying the decoded pattern at a remote
location in real time is a challenging task for off-the-shelf
attackers. Delays associated with audio recording latency, signal
processing, data communication between the two relay devices,
and replaying at a distant location, which would be required
for such an attack, would significantly increase its complexity.
Note that delay in relaying the pattern at a distant location
would lead to a shift of the relayed vibration pattern on that
side (e.g. Figure 3).
VI. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
In order to evaluate the proposed solution, a test-bed
framework was deployed. Four Android devices were used
to emulate a genuine (proximity) and a relay transaction. The
two transactions (genuine and relay) were being captured
at the same time when required, or generated based on
the captured data otherwise. Three scenarios were evaluated,
1) both transaction devices vibrating, 2) only the transaction
terminal vibrating, and 3) only the transaction instrument
vibrating. Each of these scenarios was evaluated with each of
the six sensors 1) accelerometer, 2) gravity sensor, 3) gyroscope,
4) linear acceleration sensor, 5) magnetic field, and 6) rotation
vector.
The communicating devices in the genuine transaction
scenario were a Transaction Terminal (TT), and a Transaction
Instrument (TI′). In the case of the relay transaction, the
communicating devices were the same transaction terminal TT,
and a distant Transaction Instrument (TI), located 5ft (1.5m)
away. Devices TI′ and a transaction terminal co-located with
TI (referred to as TT′) were used as relay devices. Figure 4
depicts the two transaction scenarios.
Device TI′ had a double role in this set-up. It acted as
both a genuine and a relay device. This way, data from both
scenarios could be collected simultaneously, when possible.
The two devices of each pair were placed one on top of the
other, such that the transaction terminal was at the bottom,
facing downwards, and the transaction instrument on top, facing
upwards. The two pairs (genuine and relay) were placed on
separate tables, such that vibration of one pair would not affect
the measurement of the other.
Five different attack techniques were performed against
each sensor and each vibration scenario. Four scenarios were
obtained by assuming that the attacker was capable of vibrating
a pattern from one, both, or none of the transaction devices.
A further scenario was obtained by assuming that the same
pattern could be vibrated on both relay devices during a single
transaction.
The notation that we use to describe the vibration mode of the
transaction and relay devices in this and subsequent sections has
TABLE I
VIBRATION MODES
Generated By
TT TI′ TT′ TI ExperimentallyRecorded Genuine Pair Relay Pair
Both Vibrate
V V V V 3 — —
V V V* V 3 — —
V N V V 7 VVVV VNVN + VVVV
V V N V 7 VVVV VVVV + NVNV
V N N V 7 VVVV VNVN + NVNV
TT Vibrates
V N V N 3 — —
V V V N 7 VNVN VVVV + VNVN
V V V* N 7 VNVN VVV*N (Other)
V V N N 7 VNVN VVVV + NNNN
V N N N 7 VNVN VNVN + NNNN
TI Vibrates
N V N V 3 — —
N V V V 7 NVNV NVNV + VVVV
N V V* V 3 — —
N N V V 7 NVNV NNNN + VVVV
N N N V 7 NVNV NNNN + NVNV
Other V V V* N 3 — —N N N N 3 — —
*TT′ vibrates the same pattern as TI′
the form of four characters, each character representing either
‘Vibration’ or ‘No Vibration’ using ‘V’ and ‘N’ respectively.
The sequence of four characters represents the four devices of
the test-bed, as ‘TT TI′ TT′ TI’. For example, VNVN means
that TT and TT′ vibrate, while TI′ and TI do not.
In total, 17 sets were part of the empirical analysis. Out
of these 17, 5 sets were collected from field trials, and 10
sets were generated based on the raw data from the field trials
(referred to these sets as synthetic data). Two extra sets were
collected from the field experiments, and they were used to
assist the generation of synthetic datasets.
In the case of synthetic datasets, transactions collected by
the pair TT–TI′ through field trials were regarded as genuine
transactions. Relay transactions were based on combining
genuine transaction measurements performed by TT and TI
from different, experimentally collected sets. A point to note
that synthetic data was based on raw field-data, and was not
generated randomly or based on artificial-replication of specific
features.
Figure 5 depicts the generation process of the synthetic
dataset VNNV as an example case. In this case, a genuine
transaction (no relay involved) required both transaction devices
to be vibrating. We used three sets of raw field-data for the
construction of this case. As for genuine transactions, we
considered transactions between TT and TI′ from the set VVVV.
For relay transactions, we used raw field-data captured by
device TT from the set VNVN (where TI′ did not vibrate
and TT did) and data captured by device TI from the set
NVNV (where TI vibrated and TT′ did not). Table I lists all
the evaluated vibration scenarios, and experimentally recorded
pairs that were used for the generation of synthetic pairs.
Under the ‘Generated By’ heading of the table, bold characters
in vibration mode sequences identify the raw field-data that
constitute the synthetic data for the respective mode. The two
extra sets (discussed before) are marked as ‘Other’ in the table.
The rationale for the synthetic data generation is due to one
of the following two reasons - depending upon the vibration
mode sequence:
1) Both a genuine and relay transaction could not be captured
(a) No Relay Attack Involved (b) Relay Attack Involved
Fig. 3. Vibration Fusion Without and With Relay Attack
Fig. 4. Test-bed Scenarios
simultaneously (i.e. when TI′’s vibration mode was not
the same as TI).
2) Recorded data could be used for the generation of a pair
(e.g. in the case of VVNV, whose genuine pair can be
taken from VVVV and the relay pair by using the same
pair’s TT recording with NVNV’s TI).
A total of 400 transactions per captured pair were recorded
for each sensor (totalling 16,800 transaction pairs), based
on which 24,000 synthetic relay transactions were generated
(400 for each synthetic set). Each synthetic set consisted of
400 genuine transactions, recorded through our test-bed, and
400 synthetic ones, based on the combination of recorded
transactions.
Four Android applications were developed, one for each
device. The devices used in the genuine pair were two Samsung
Galaxy S4 (GT-I9500) devices. For the relay pair, a Samsung
Galaxy S4 and a Nexus 5 were used. Each device was capable
of communicating with the next device and the previous device
in the chain (see Figure 4) through WiFi, using UDP packets.
For example, device TI′ could communicate with device TT
as part of the genuine transaction, and TT′ as part of the relay
transaction.
Fig. 5. Synthetic Data Generation (VNNV)
Figure 6 depicts the transaction process between the four
devices. A transaction was initiated through a UDP packet
from device TT to TI′, containing a transaction ID, the sensor
to be used in the transaction, and which device(s) should
vibrate (vibration mode). The same information, along with the
random pattern that TI′ would vibrate, if the vibration mode
required it, were forwarded from TI′ to TT′. Upon initiation
of a transaction, a 500ms long random pattern was vibrated
by one or both transaction devices, depending on the current
transaction’s vibration mode. At the same time the devices were
recording the impact of the vibration using some sensor. Upon
completion of the transaction, the measurements were saved
on a local SQLite database, for each of the relevant devices
for later extraction and analysis. Subsequent transactions were
separated by a 5 second gap in order for the devices to rest.
VII. TRANSACTION DATA ANALYSIS
For the analysis of the collected data, the Weka [33]
machine learning software was used to determine whether
the measurements of TI′i and TIi were in proximity with TTi,
i.e. whether it was possible to uniquely distinguish between
(TI′i,TTi) and (TIi,TTi). On Android, all the examined sensors
produce a vector of values consisting of x, y and z components.
The vector magnitude (Eq. 1) was used as a general-purpose
method for producing a single, combined value prior to
generating the training sets for machine learning.
M =
√
x2 + y2 + z2 (1)
We calculated the ‘optimal’ threshold that separates illegit-
imate and legitimate attempts: the threshold that minimizes
equal error rate. The threshold was based on the probability
estimate output by the learned classification model, i.e. the
estimated probability that a transaction is legitimate. To avoid
optimistic bias in the error estimate when applying machine
learning, it was necessary to perform a train-test experiment.
More specifically, the full set of transaction pairs was split into
a training set and a test set. The machine learning algorithm
was applied to the training set to build a classification model
that can output class probability estimates. Once the model
had been built, it was applied to obtain probability estimates
for the test set. When we split the data into training and test
sets, we ensured that two transactions with the same ID (i.e.,
a legitimate and a fraudulent transaction that were recorded
simultaneously) were either both in the training set or both in
the test set, to avoid potential bias. Moreover, instead of using a
TT TI′ TT′ TI
sensor|transaction ID
|vibration mode
sensor|transaction ID
|vibration mode
|{vibration pattern}
sensor|transaction ID
|vibration mode
vibrate() vibrateAndRecord()vibrateAndRecord() vibrateAndRecord()
saveMeasurement() saveMeasurement()validateReceivedData()
saveMeasurement()
Fig. 6. Measurement Recording Overview
single train-test split, we used 10-fold cross-validation repeated
10 times, a standard estimation technique from machine learning
that generates 100 different train-test splits based on shuffled
versions of the data. The learning algorithm was run 100
times on the 100 training sets, to build 100 models, and these
100 models were evaluated on the corresponding test sets.
Performance estimates from the 100 test sets were averaged to
obtain a final performance estimate.
We computed Equal Error Rates (EERs) by determining
thresholds where the rate of false acceptances (FAR) was
equal to the rate of false rejections (FRR) for each tested
sensor. The FAR and FRR were measured at each threshold
using Eqs. 2 and 3. To establish the relevant counts in these
equations, the estimated probability of being legitimate, as
output by the learned classifier, was compared to the threshold
under consideration. Ideally, a chosen threshold should reject
all illegitimate transactions, namely those between the distant
instrument and the terminal, while accepting all legitimate
transactions between the transaction instrument and terminal.
This would yield an equal error rate that is zero.
TAR =
TA
TA+ FR
TRR =
TR
TR+ FA
(2)
FAR = 1− TRR FRR = 1− TAR (3)
When training and testing each machine learning model, we
used the individual differences |Ai,j −Bi,j | (where Ai,j refers
to the jth datapoint of the ith sensor measurement on device A)
as attributes (also called features or independent variables) that
describe each pair of transactions. Each example for training
and testing the machine learning model thus had 100 numeric
features (corresponding to 500ms sampled at 5ms intervals).
An example was labelled as positive if it corresponded to a
legitimate transaction and as negative otherwise.
Weka’s default settings were used for each of the first four
machine learning algorithms in Table II. The first classifier, a
random forest [34], is based on inducing a collection of decision
trees, in a semi-random manner, from bootstrap samples of the
original training set. By default, Weka generates an random
forest consisting of 100 decision trees. The second classifier
TABLE II
ESTIMATED EER FOR MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS, OBTAINED BY
REPEATING 10-FOLD CROSS-VALIDATION 10 TIMES
Classifier
Vibration
Mode Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree LogisticRegression
Support Vector
Machine
Accelerometer
Both Vibrate 0.069 0.094 0.104 0.172 0.067
TT Vibrates 0.096 0.185 0.143 0.247 0.084
TI Vibrates 0.083 0.110 0.123 0.186 0.078
Gravity
Both Vibrate 0.500 0.493 0.500 0.488 0.492
TT Vibrates 0.499 0.484 0.500 0.486 0.490
TI Vibrates 0.503 0.494 0.500 0.500 0.497
Gyroscope
Both Vibrate 0.003 0.001 0.009 0.014 0.003
TT Vibrates 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001
TI Vibrates 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.002
Linear Acceleration
Both Vibrate 0.015 0.017 0.042 0.047 0.014
TT Vibrates 0.016 0.015 0.038 0.044 0.016
TI Vibrates 0.002 0.002 0.020 0.009 0.003
Magnetic Field
Both Vibrate 0.059 0.315 0.187 0.477 0.031
TT Vibrates 0.065 0.202 0.132 0.291 0.035
TI Vibrates 0.146 0.236 0.149 0.409 0.138
Rotation Vector
Both Vibrate 0.008 0.008 0.031 0.113 0.007
TT Vibrates 0.002 0.010 0.014 0.106 0.002
TI Vibrates 0.016 0.005 0.024 0.039 0.013
is the naive Bayes classifier. It assumes independence of
the attributes given the classification. We used a Gaussian
distribution with a diagonal covariance matrix, which is Weka’s
default. The third classifier, logistic regression, assumes that
the log-odds of the class probabilities are linearly related to
the attributes. The fourth classifier consists of decision trees
obtained using the C4.5 algorithm [35]. For the fifth classifier,
support vector machines (SVMs) optimised with the SMO
algorithm [36], the complexity parameter C and the width of
the RBF kernel γ were tuned using a grid search by performing
internal cross-validation on the training data. AUROC was the
criterion being optimized in the grid search.
Table II shows the results obtained from the different
machine learning algorithms. These results were obtained by
averaging estimated equal error rates across all the relevant
attack scenarios from Table I. The best result for each sensor is
shown in bold. The results for individual attack scenarios can
be found in Appendices A (both devices vibrating scenario), B
(terminal only vibrating scenario), and C (instrument only
vibrating scenario). For each dataset/sensor and learning
algorithm, these tables shows the mean and standard deviation
of the 100 equal error rate estimates obtained using 10-fold
cross-validation repeated 10 times.
Table II shows that SVMs produce the lowest equal error
rate for most sensors/vibration modes. Random forests and
naive Bayes also demonstrated low equal error rates for many
sensors/vibration modes. The results from the machine learning
experiments indicate that all sensors apart from the gravity sen-
sor provide useful information for the discrimination between
legitimate and distant transactions. Ranking the sensors based
on discriminative power (i.e., equal error rate) when evaluated
in conjunction with SVM classifiers yields the following
ranking (best to worst): gyroscope, rotation vector, linear
acceleration, magnetic field, accelerometer, and gravity. The
same ranking holds for random forests. Based on naive Bayes,
the ranking is: gyroscope, rotation vector, linear acceleration,
accelerometer, magnetic field, and gravity. Finally, none of the
vibration modes seems to be performing substantially better
than the others, except in the cases of magnetic field, where
the TI only vibrating performed substantially worse than the
rest, and the case of accelerometer, where TT only vibrating
performed substantially worse.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND OUTCOME
The analysis of the experimental data indicates that the
effectiveness of the proposed solution as a PRAD mechanism
is high. Using most sensors, the empirically observed relay
attack detection rate is higher than that of previously proposed
solutions [14], [16], [37], [38]. No particular attack against the
proposed solution performs better than the others. However,
some attacks perform better than others depending on classifiers
and sensors involved. The performance of the solution is not
significantly affected by using any of the evaluated attacks.
Even though a different smartphone was used as device TT′,
no significant impact was observed in the results. Observing
the results of TI only vibrating, where TT′’s impact in
the transaction was negligible, except in the case of using
the magnetic field sensor, no significant degradation in the
effectiveness of the proposed solution was observed. However,
further investigation might be required before deployment in
the real world. More aspects should also be examined, like
the impact of protective smartphone cases on the proposed
solution.
Moreover, even though no significant performance differ-
ences were observed between different vibration modes, in
order to prevent acoustic attacks by a more resourceful attacker,
both devices vibrating might be preferred. Observing the
vibrated pattern has been demonstrated with relatively high
success rate in [32], so it might have some effectiveness against
the proposed technique. Fusing vibrations from both devices
can be a significant barrier against off-the-shelf attackers, as
explained in Section V-B.
Finally, no additional or non-standard hardware on the TI
side is likely to be required, like in many of the previously
proposed solutions, as in [26], and [16]. The examined sensors
are available in a large variety of smartphones, and most modern
smartphones will be equipped with at least one of them. Many
of the previously proposed solutions might also be vulnerable
in the presence of an attacker with context manipulating
capabilities [39]. Since this solution is not dependant upon the
surrounding environment, such attacks do not apply, unless the
attacker physically tampers with the devices.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Communicating devices are vulnerable to relay attacks.
Traditional distance bounding protocols that aim to counter
such attacks might not be applicable in the field of smartphones.
Alternative approaches against off-the-shelf attackers have been
proposed, mostly based on sensing of the ambient environment.
However, these might not be suitable or secure under certain
scenarios, like in the case of transactions with industry imposed
time restrictions of up to 500ms (e.g. EMV and transportation
related transactions). The generation of a random bit/stream-
based Artificial Ambient Environment (AAE) by peripherals of
the transaction devices has demonstrated promising results as
a Proximity and Relay Attack Detection (PRAD) mechanism
when using infrared light as an AAE actuator.
In this work we have investigated the use of vibration as an
AAE actuator. During the transaction, one (unidirectional) or
both (bidirectional) transaction devices vibrate some random
pattern, which is measured by a selected ambient sensor by both
transaction devices. The two measurements are then compared
for similarity, in order to establish proximity evidence.
A test-bed was designed and built for the evaluation of the
proposed solution as a PRAD mechanism. We evaluated three
different vibration modes (only one, or both the transaction
devices vibrating a random pattern), against five different attack
scenarios. Six ambient sensors were evaluated. A total of
36,000 genuine-relay transaction pairs, based on field trials,
were collected, or synthetically generated. Analysis using five
machine learning classifiers was performed, indicating high
classification accuracy between genuine and relay transactions
on all vibration modes, and using most of the sensors.
As part of our ongoing investigation, we are planning to
expand the study by using more devices. We are also planning to
examine whether using multiple sensors simultaneously (sensor
fusion) will increase the accuracy of the system. Finally, we
are planning to conduct a user study in order to explore the
effectiveness of the proposed solution in this case, along with
potential usability concerns.
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APPENDIX A
RESULTS: BOTH DEVICES VIBRATE
TABLE III
ESTIMATED EER FOR MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS, OBTAINED BY
REPEATING 10-FOLD CROSS-VALIDATION 10 TIMES (CASE: BOTH DEVICES
VIBRATE)
Classifier
Vibration
Mode Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree LogisticRegression
Support Vector
Machine
Accelerometer
VVVV 0.073 ± 0.030 0.115 ± 0.041 0.120 ± 0.047 0.200 ± 0.042 0.058 ± 0.026
VVV*V 0.075 ± 0.032 0.111 ± 0.035 0.122 ± 0.041 0.215 ± 0.046 0.067 ± 0.028
VNVV 0.051 ± 0.027 0.066 ± 0.026 0.079 ± 0.036 0.148 ± 0.039 0.049 ± 0.022
VVNV 0.068 ± 0.030 0.100 ± 0.039 0.099 ± 0.041 0.147 ± 0.042 0.084 ± 0.032
VNNV 0.076 ± 0.033 0.078 ± 0.038 0.099 ± 0.047 0.148 ± 0.036 0.079 ± 0.036
Gravity
VVVV 0.497 ± 0.048 0.498 ± 0.042 0.500 ± 0.000 0.459 ± 0.041 0.500 ± 0.000
VVV*V 0.508 ± 0.053 0.505 ± 0.041 0.500 ± 0.000 0.540 ± 0.038 0.500 ± 0.000
VNVV 0.509 ± 0.053 0.487 ± 0.056 0.500 ± 0.000 0.453 ± 0.050 0.458 ± 0.050
VVNV 0.493 ± 0.054 0.492 ± 0.041 0.500 ± 0.000 0.510 ± 0.041 0.500 ± 0.000
VNNV 0.494 ± 0.053 0.483 ± 0.055 0.500 ± 0.000 0.478 ± 0.056 0.502 ± 0.062
Gyroscope
VVVV 0.004 ± 0.009 0.004 ± 0.011 0.009 ± 0.014 0.021 ± 0.016 0.004 ± 0.009
VVV*V 0.002 ± 0.008 0.000 ± 0.000 0.008 ± 0.014 0.009 ± 0.013 0.003 ± 0.009
VNVV 0.004 ± 0.010 0.001 ± 0.005 0.010 ± 0.015 0.008 ± 0.014 0.003 ± 0.009
VVNV 0.005 ± 0.011 0.002 ± 0.008 0.010 ± 0.016 0.019 ± 0.017 0.003 ± 0.009
VNNV 0.002 ± 0.010 0.000 ± 0.003 0.009 ± 0.015 0.013 ± 0.016 0.002 ± 0.007
Linear Acceleration
VVVV 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.021 ± 0.025 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000
VVV*V 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.023 ± 0.027 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000
VNVV 0.016 ± 0.019 0.015 ± 0.019 0.045 ± 0.032 0.057 ± 0.032 0.016 ± 0.018
VVNV 0.027 ± 0.021 0.028 ± 0.022 0.058 ± 0.034 0.090 ± 0.042 0.026 ± 0.022
VNNV 0.032 ± 0.025 0.042 ± 0.028 0.065 ± 0.042 0.088 ± 0.036 0.026 ± 0.023
Magnetic Field
VVVV 0.082 ± 0.030 0.316 ± 0.060 0.218 ± 0.073 0.488 ± 0.062 0.042 ± 0.022
VVV*V 0.100 ± 0.029 0.315 ± 0.053 0.220 ± 0.068 0.530 ± 0.052 0.045 ± 0.026
VNVV 0.008 ± 0.012 0.312 ± 0.059 0.140 ± 0.058 0.441 ± 0.064 0.009 ± 0.013
VVNV 0.097 ± 0.033 0.311 ± 0.061 0.219 ± 0.100 0.484 ± 0.060 0.048 ± 0.023
VNNV 0.009 ± 0.014 0.322 ± 0.046 0.136 ± 0.052 0.444 ± 0.060 0.009 ± 0.014
Rotation Vector
VVVV 0.007 ± 0.012 0.005 ± 0.017 0.031 ± 0.027 0.109 ± 0.047 0.008 ± 0.013
VVV*V 0.007 ± 0.012 0.005 ± 0.016 0.035 ± 0.027 0.114 ± 0.054 0.005 ± 0.010
VNVV 0.009 ± 0.012 0.010 ± 0.024 0.031 ± 0.026 0.109 ± 0.045 0.007 ± 0.012
VVNV 0.009 ± 0.013 0.009 ± 0.024 0.030 ± 0.026 0.116 ± 0.051 0.007 ± 0.014
VNNV 0.008 ± 0.012 0.009 ± 0.024 0.030 ± 0.025 0.116 ± 0.051 0.007 ± 0.014
*TT′ vibrates the same pattern as TI′
APPENDIX B
RESULTS: TRANSACTION TERMINAL VIBRATES
TABLE IV
ESTIMATED EER FOR MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS, OBTAINED BY
REPEATING 10-FOLD CROSS-VALIDATION 10 TIMES (CASE: TRANSACTION
TERMINAL VIBRATES)
Classifier
Vibration
Mode Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree LogisticRegression
Support Vector
Machine
Accelerometer
VNVN 0.055 ± 0.025 0.111 ± 0.039 0.095 ± 0.041 0.168 ± 0.038 0.033 ± 0.019
VVVN 0.037 ± 0.026 0.082 ± 0.039 0.068 ± 0.033 0.148 ± 0.049 0.015 ± 0.016
VVV*N 0.121 ± 0.036 0.465 ± 0.271 0.216 ± 0.054 0.474 ± 0.049 0.092 ± 0.048
VVNN 0.138 ± 0.040 0.141 ± 0.049 0.174 ± 0.050 0.248 ± 0.055 0.146 ± 0.040
VNNN 0.131 ± 0.036 0.124 ± 0.041 0.164 ± 0.056 0.195 ± 0.043 0.133 ± 0.037
Gravity
VNVN 0.503 ± 0.053 0.492 ± 0.041 0.500 ± 0.000 0.481 ± 0.042 0.500 ± 0.000
VVVN 0.496 ± 0.058 0.473 ± 0.054 0.500 ± 0.000 0.484 ± 0.056 0.483 ± 0.083
VVV*N 0.489 ± 0.052 0.447 ± 0.056 0.500 ± 0.000 0.471 ± 0.056 0.457 ± 0.055
VVNN 0.503 ± 0.059 0.481 ± 0.051 0.500 ± 0.000 0.484 ± 0.052 0.509 ± 0.081
VNNN 0.502 ± 0.053 0.527 ± 0.049 0.500 ± 0.000 0.508 ± 0.041 0.500 ± 0.000
Gyroscope
VNVN 0.002 ± 0.006 0.000 ± 0.000 0.003 ± 0.008 0.001 ± 0.006 0.000 ± 0.003
VVVN 0.000 ± 0.000 0.001 ± 0.007 0.003 ± 0.008 0.003 ± 0.011 0.001 ± 0.005
VVV*N 0.000 ± 0.000 0.005 ± 0.011 0.003 ± 0.010 0.001 ± 0.004 0.000 ± 0.000
VVNN 0.000 ± 0.000 0.001 ± 0.004 0.003 ± 0.009 0.005 ± 0.011 0.001 ± 0.004
VNNN 0.002 ± 0.006 0.000 ± 0.000 0.002 ± 0.007 0.005 ± 0.011 0.003 ± 0.008
Continues in the next column. . .
*TT′ vibrates the same pattern as TI′
Continuation from previous column. . .
Classifier
Vibration
Mode Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree LogisticRegression
Support Vector
Machine
Linear Acceleration
VNVN 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.012 ± 0.015 0.000 ± 0.000 0.001 ± 0.004
VVVN 0.007 ± 0.012 0.004 ± 0.009 0.031 ± 0.021 0.037 ± 0.022 0.003 ± 0.008
VVV*N 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.013 ± 0.020 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000
VVNN 0.034 ± 0.025 0.034 ± 0.026 0.058 ± 0.033 0.087 ± 0.032 0.034 ± 0.023
VNNN 0.038 ± 0.022 0.035 ± 0.025 0.077 ± 0.037 0.095 ± 0.036 0.042 ± 0.025
Magnetic Field
VNVN 0.020 ± 0.019 0.328 ± 0.051 0.146 ± 0.053 0.443 ± 0.064 0.014 ± 0.018
VVVN 0.117 ± 0.042 0.321 ± 0.058 0.203 ± 0.114 0.480 ± 0.053 0.058 ± 0.030
VVV*N 0.082 ± 0.035 0.125 ± 0.040 0.123 ± 0.048 0.183 ± 0.045 0.045 ± 0.025
VVNN 0.080 ± 0.028 0.122 ± 0.036 0.119 ± 0.041 0.176 ± 0.039 0.044 ± 0.022
VNNN 0.024 ± 0.020 0.116 ± 0.039 0.071 ± 0.041 0.171 ± 0.041 0.014 ± 0.018
Rotation Vector
VNVN 0.006 ± 0.013 0.005 ± 0.016 0.022 ± 0.023 0.119 ± 0.046 0.006 ± 0.012
VVVN 0.005 ± 0.011 0.004 ± 0.013 0.020 ± 0.022 0.118 ± 0.048 0.005 ± 0.010
VVV*N 0.000 ± 0.002 0.014 ± 0.019 0.011 ± 0.015 0.096 ± 0.038 0.000 ± 0.000
VVNN 0.000 ± 0.000 0.014 ± 0.019 0.008 ± 0.015 0.100 ± 0.045 0.000 ± 0.000
VNNN 0.000 ± 0.000 0.014 ± 0.019 0.008 ± 0.012 0.099 ± 0.046 0.000 ± 0.000
*TT′ vibrates the same pattern as TI′
APPENDIX C
RESULTS: TRANSACTION INSTRUMENT VIBRATES
TABLE V
ESTIMATED EER FOR MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS, OBTAINED BY
REPEATING 10-FOLD CROSS-VALIDATION 10 TIMES (CASE: TRANSACTION
INSTRUMENT VIBRATES)
Classifier
Vibration
Mode Random Forest Naive Bayes Decision Tree LogisticRegression
Support Vector
Machine
Accelerometer
NVNV 0.101 ± 0.038 0.111 ± 0.043 0.125 ± 0.052 0.180 ± 0.040 0.104 ± 0.039
NVVV 0.026 ± 0.021 0.037 ± 0.028 0.069 ± 0.033 0.090 ± 0.031 0.012 ± 0.014
NVV*V 0.071 ± 0.030 0.115 ± 0.042 0.110 ± 0.041 0.188 ± 0.042 0.046 ± 0.026
NNVV 0.100 ± 0.036 0.128 ± 0.039 0.148 ± 0.054 0.245 ± 0.054 0.082 ± 0.030
NNNV 0.118 ± 0.040 0.158 ± 0.059 0.164 ± 0.049 0.228 ± 0.041 0.144 ± 0.037
Gravity
NVNV 0.485 ± 0.056 0.487 ± 0.047 0.500 ± 0.000 0.502 ± 0.040 0.500 ± 0.000
NVVV 0.498 ± 0.056 0.506 ± 0.041 0.500 ± 0.000 0.497 ± 0.048 0.500 ± 0.000
NVV*V 0.501 ± 0.049 0.488 ± 0.042 0.500 ± 0.000 0.477 ± 0.039 0.500 ± 0.000
NNVV 0.514 ± 0.058 0.493 ± 0.051 0.500 ± 0.000 0.506 ± 0.049 0.482 ± 0.091
NNNV 0.516 ± 0.054 0.497 ± 0.051 0.500 ± 0.000 0.517 ± 0.054 0.501 ± 0.123
Gyroscope
NVNV 0.000 ± 0.003 0.000 ± 0.000 0.005 ± 0.011 0.008 ± 0.014 0.000 ± 0.002
NVVV 0.002 ± 0.006 0.011 ± 0.015 0.004 ± 0.009 0.011 ± 0.014 0.006 ± 0.012
NVV*V 0.002 ± 0.008 0.003 ± 0.009 0.007 ± 0.013 0.003 ± 0.008 0.002 ± 0.007
NNVV 0.002 ± 0.006 0.000 ± 0.000 0.006 ± 0.012 0.004 ± 0.009 0.000 ± 0.004
NNNV 0.000 ± 0.003 0.000 ± 0.000 0.006 ± 0.012 0.005 ± 0.010 0.000 ± 0.003
Linear Acceleration
NVNV 0.001 ± 0.004 0.000 ± 0.003 0.024 ± 0.023 0.007 ± 0.012 0.002 ± 0.006
NVVV 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.022 ± 0.021 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000
NVV*V 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000 0.017 ± 0.020 0.000 ± 0.000 0.000 ± 0.000
NNVV 0.002 ± 0.007 0.002 ± 0.007 0.017 ± 0.021 0.014 ± 0.015 0.004 ± 0.009
NNNV 0.009 ± 0.012 0.008 ± 0.014 0.020 ± 0.022 0.025 ± 0.019 0.010 ± 0.014
Magnetic Field
NVNV 0.267 ± 0.051 0.273 ± 0.052 0.124 ± 0.109 0.435 ± 0.053 0.276 ± 0.048
NVVV 0.116 ± 0.039 0.119 ± 0.049 0.110 ± 0.062 0.197 ± 0.047 0.126 ± 0.045
NVV*V 0.254 ± 0.056 0.262 ± 0.060 0.198 ± 0.129 0.444 ± 0.056 0.268 ± 0.050
NNVV 0.045 ± 0.025 0.253 ± 0.056 0.171 ± 0.063 0.483 ± 0.066 0.010 ± 0.013
NNNV 0.046 ± 0.026 0.271 ± 0.060 0.143 ± 0.087 0.488 ± 0.064 0.011 ± 0.013
Rotation Vector
NVNV 0.019 ± 0.022 0.003 ± 0.012 0.030 ± 0.026 0.041 ± 0.025 0.016 ± 0.020
NVVV 0.009 ± 0.015 0.010 ± 0.016 0.007 ± 0.012 0.003 ± 0.008 0.000 ± 0.000
NVV*V 0.017 ± 0.018 0.004 ± 0.012 0.024 ± 0.024 0.060 ± 0.024 0.017 ± 0.019
NNVV 0.019 ± 0.019 0.004 ± 0.015 0.030 ± 0.024 0.050 ± 0.029 0.015 ± 0.019
NNNV 0.017 ± 0.019 0.004 ± 0.015 0.030 ± 0.024 0.041 ± 0.025 0.015 ± 0.018
*TT′ vibrates the same pattern as TI′
